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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has reoriented policymakers from micro prudential supervisory to systemic orientated regulation 
and macro prudential supervisory frameworks. This paper presents a macro prudential approach for monitoring the banking 
system soundness in the European Union. Using panel data techniques we have estimated the impact of the macroeconomic 
environment on two key financial soundness indicators of banking systems from 27 countries. Also, we have developed a 
macro prudential supervisory framework for identification and monitoring the systemic risks, from both backward and 
forward-looking perspectives. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we aim to research several elements related to macro prudential banking supervision. Firstly, 
we analysed in short the concept of macro prudential supervision. Subsequently, we turned to the study of 
institutional problems related to the macro prudential supervisory activity at the level of the European Union 
(EU). The next step was the setting up of a framework for macro prudential analysis. Finally, our paper turns to 
an empirical approach to identify macroeconomic variables that have been having a significant impact on two 
aggregate bank indicators in the banking systems of the European Union Member States.  
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2. The framework for macro prudential supervision 
The recent financial crisis has led to a re-thinking of the analytical approaches and of the policies concerning 
financial stability. The crisis has determined a greater focus on systemic risks, the inclusion of the financial 
sectors in macroeconomic models, and the shift away from the micro prudential to the macro prudential 
approach in regulation and supervision Borio, 2011. 
 
Clement, 2010; Galati and Moessner, 2011; and Borio, 2011 analysed retrospectively the use of this term. 
References to it were first made in the 1970s in the minutes of the Cooke Committee, the forerunner of the 
present-day Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as well as in a document issued by the Bank of 
England. Nonetheless, the term has become more widely used in the context of the current financial crisis. An 
increasing number of researchers produced detailed papers concerning the macro prudential policies for 
conferences (e.g. Shirakawa, 2009; Nijathaworn, 2009; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2009; Bini-Smaghi, 2009; Kohn , 
2009, and Brouwer, 2010). Macro prudential
regulation and supervision; it signifies the fine-tuning of the elements of this framework from a systemic 
perspective, rather than from the perspective that considers the security and soundness of each individual 
- ergence of a security benchmark that 
considers the system as a whole, and fosters sound individual institutions; finally, it states clearly and explicitly 
that the risk emerges as a consequence of the collective behaviour of the financial institutions (i.e. endogenous) 
and not independent from the influence of these institutions (i.e. exogenous). 
2.1. The lack of clarity of the institutional framework for macroprudential supervision 
In order to perform the macro prudential supervision efficiently and secure the soundness of the banking 
system, it is necessary to clarify some of the structural aspects of the implementation of macro prudential 
policies at European level and of the authority in charge of macro prudential supervision. This observation 
concerns in particular the banking systems since it is the core element of any financial system.  A study 
conducted collaboratively by the Financial Stability Board(FSB), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)(2011) identified 5 relevant aspects that require clarification: the 
mandate; the competencies and instruments; accountability and transparency mechanisms; the composition of 
the decision-making body; the mechanism for the coordination of internal policies. 
The macro prudential mandate needs to be clearly and explicitly stated. In this way, the members of the staff 
working in the institution itself will gain a good understanding of the assignment of the tasks: who does what 
and why. The formal mandate can improve the clarity of the decision-making process; prevent passivity and 
blockages in decision-making, especially in cases where opinions diverge. It is essential to hold the necessary 
competence when calling on directly on other organizations to provide information, especially in cases when 
the data is not available to the authorities in charge of macro prudential supervision. When data is available and 
is collected by other institutions, it needs to be established who will have the competence to access the 
respective data bases. Furthermore, the necessary competencies for establishing, using and directly fine-tuning 
the macro prudential instruments need to be secured, especially in the case when the mandate and the control of 
the instruments are not within the responsibility of the same one institution. Another challenge emerges when it 
comes to establishing accountability in a situation when there are no clear and efficient benchmarks. This issue 
is further complicated by the problem of the side that supports the costs of the macro prudential measures. In 
many situations, the macro prudential supervision bodies are responsible to the Parliament. For instance, at the 
level of the European Union, the European Systemic Risk Board is responsible to the European Parliament. 
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2.2. Tools used in macroprudential supervision 
The literature in the field abounds in articles concerning tools that should be used in macro prudential 
analysis. Nevertheless, research is still insufficient, opinions often diverge and it is very difficult to establish a 
common framework necessary to perform macro prudential analysis and supervision. From the multitude of 
studies, it is essential to identify those precise methods and instruments that suit best the management of the 
systemic risk and the consolidation of the financial stability. To our view, the tools required to perform this task 
are: high-quality statistical data; indicators and quantitative methods to identify, measure, monitor, and predict 
the systemic risk; instruments used to lower the macro prudential risks (macro prudential policy instruments). 
In order to evaluate the systemic risk and fine-tune the impact of the policies designed to insure financial 
stability, it is essential to identify and secure the availability of relevant data. The value-added of the 
instruments used to measure the systemic risk is determined by the quality, the up-to-datedness, and the 
relevance of the data, fundamental in providing a robust statistical data basis for macro prudential analysis. For 
the moment, at international level there is no consensus as to the set of indicators necessary and sufficient to 
monitor the financial system as a whole. However, the great number of scientific papers published on the topic 
will certainly contribute to the improvement and standardization of such indicators. Borio and Drehmann , 2009 
have already categorized these indicators under 4 main headings: 
 Indicators of Financial Distress: under this category we can include the Financial Soundness 
Indicators established by the IMF to perform macro prudential analysis towards improving the 
financial stability and contain the consequences of a potential crash of the financial system (IMF, 
2008); the indicators are calculated on the basis of data available in the balance sheets and concern the 
degree of capitalisation of the bank, the quality of the financial assets, the degree of profitability, the 
liquidity, the value of the provision for depreciation, units in the balance sheet filled by credits granted 
to households and companies. These indicators are backward-looking; they consider past data and 
actions; 
 Early Warning Indicators: a forward-looking supervision instrument with a predictive perspective, 
used to analyse the systemic weaknesses and test in advance the likelihood of a financial crisis; 
 Indicators based on Vector Autoregression Models (VAR). The VAR model, created by Sims in 1980 
is a method of economic prediction based on data series. This method resembles modelling through 
simultaneous equations, i.e. considering simultaneously several endogenous variables. Each 
endogenous variable is determined by its past values, as well as the past values of the other 
endogenous variable that are included in the model. These are very simple mathematic representations 
of the economy based on aggregated data with few theoretical restrictions Gujarati, 2004; 
 Multi-modular measurement models at systemic level (e.g. macro stress tests): stress tests are used to 
determine the stability of a given system or entity. They involve testing them beyond the normal 
working capacity, often to the breaking point to observe results. In the field literature, stress tests have 
been traditionally performed on asset portfolios, but recently they were performed across the board on 
banks, banking systems, and the financial system , 2007. 
The macro prudential policy instruments can be broadly defined as a set of measures intended to monitor, 
prevent and treat systemic risks, but also to reduce the costs of systemic crises Delgado and Meza, 2011. There 
, but one thing is certain: reducing 
systemic risks and the costs during systemic crises should be the main objectives of such a toolbox.  In a 
progress reports produced in 2011 for the G20 Leaders, the FSB, and IMF and BIS have identified several 
commonly used macro prudential instruments:  
 Instruments to address threats from excessive credit expansion in the system: time-varying capital 
requirements (e.g., risk weights), dynamic provisions, ceilings on credit or credit growth, caps, 
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possibly time-varying, on loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and on debt service-to-income (DTI) ratio, 
minimum, possibly time varying, margin requirements, reserve requirements;  
 Instruments to address key amplification mechanisms of systemic risk: limits on maturity mismatches, 
caps on foreign currency lending, limits on net open currency positions or mismatches, levy on non-
core funding;   
 Instruments to mitigate structural vulnerabilities and limit spill-over from stress: additional loss 
absorbency related to systemic importance, disclosure policy for markets and institutions targeting 
systemic risk, resolution requirements for Systemically Important Financial Institutions. 
3. An empirical analysis concerning the macro prudential supervision of the banking system in the 
European Union 
The empirical analysis performed on banking systems of the EU Member States aims at identifying the 
macroeconomic variables that have a major influence on two macro prudential supervision indicators (non-
performing loans to total gross loans and the bank capital to assets ratio) and, implicitly, on the stability of the 
banking systems.  
3.1. Data and methodology used  
The aggregated data used in this analysis is made up of annual data from the period 2001 to 2010 in the 27 
EU Member States and were collected from three sources: t Indicators 
(WDI), Eurostat and European Banking Federation (EBF). The analysis of the empirical relation between the 
systemic risk indicators at the level of the sample of banks analysed and the macroeconomic variables specific 
to each individual country was performed by using the least-squares method in a general panel regression 
model. In order to single out the shocks that occurred throughout the analysed period of time that had a 
common influence on the sampled banking systems, fixed effects were introduced for the period. In order to 
asses bank non-performing loans to total gross loans and the bank capital to assets ratio depending on a series of 
macroeconomic variables, the following regression equations were used: 
 
NPLit 0 1ICPit 2GDPit 3Govit 4URit 6IRSit 7LIRit t it    (1) 
 




NPLit is the rate of non-performing loans calculated as percent of the total volume of loans granted in the 
respective i country at the t moment, Capit is the ratio of banks' capital to the banks' total asset given as a 
percentage in the respective country i at the moment t, ICPit stands for the harmonized indices of consumer 
prices in the respective country i at the moment t, given as a percentage, GDPit stands for the annual growing 
rate of the gross domestic product as a measure of the economic activity, Govit stands for the government 
deficit/surplus in the respective country i at the moment t, given as percentage of GDP, URit stands for the 
annual average unemployment rate calculated as percentage of the total labour force in the respective country i 
at the moment t, IRSit stands for the interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate) given as percentage in 
the respective country i at the moment t, LIRit is the lending interest rate given as percentage in the respective 
country i at the moment t,  Rezit stands for the total reserves (special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members 
held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities) minus gold 
holdings owned by the respective country i at the moment t, in current US dollars, WLit is the labour 
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productivity in the respective country i at the moment t, t indicates the fixed effects for the time frame in which 
shocks occurred on the market with common impact on the banking system in the respective countries (e.g. 
financial crisis, sovereign debts crisis), it stands for the estimation error.  
3.2. Results 
The decisive factors in determining the rate of non-performing loans and the bank capital are outlined in 
Table 1 and were reached through the least squares technique in the general panel regression model with fixed 
effects on the period. By looking at the t-Statistic, we can notice that some of the proposed variables are 
significant in explaining the oscillations of the non-performing loans rate and of the bank capital.  
Tabel 1 The effect of macroeconomic variables on two key macro prudential indicators 
NB: Unbalanced panel with fixed effects on period. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10 %; 
Source: author's interpretation  
There are some direct links between non-performing loan and macroeconomic variables, the determination 
coefficient shows that 55,91% of the variation of the dependent variable (the non-performing loans) can be 
explained by the estimated regression model. First, there is a strong positive correlation between the rate of 
non-performing loans and the unemployment rate. If unemployment grows by 1%, it determines an average 
increase of 0,52% of the rate of non-performing loans. The increase of unemployment mirrors the economic 
cycles and reflects the instability that creeps in at macroeconomic level. On the other hand, the rate of non-
performing loans is impacted in a negative way by the GDP,  given as percentage of 
GDP and the lending interest rate, respectively. The more substantial the latter are, the more the percentage of 
non-performing loans and of the aggregated portfolio of the respective bank will decrease. In the light of this 
observation, we can envisage that an increase of the interest rate for the granted loans by 1 percentage point can 
be easily accomplished and will subsequently determine a decrease of 0,58% of the non-performing loans rate.  
The conclusions we reached are convergent with other studies concerning the macro prudential supervision. 
Jakubic and Schmeider, 2008 demonstrated that a high unemployment rate and a high real interest rate have a 
positive impact on the rate of non-performing loans in the EU Member States. Schou-Zibell, Albert and Song 
(2010) also pointed at a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the rate of non-performing 
loans in the developed world but also in the emerging economies of Asia, Europe and Latin America. At the 
same, these authors noticed a negative correlation between the GDP per capita and the rate of non-performing 
loans, a situation specific to the developed countries and the emerging European states. The inflation showed to 
Macroeconomic variables impact on nonperforming loans (NPL) Macroeconomic variables impact on bank capital to assets ratio(Cap) 
Explanatory 
variable Coefficient  Error t-Statistic 
Explanatory 
variable Coefficient  Error t-Statistic 
C -0.363816  0.860968 -0.422566 C 6.452415 *** 0.220089 29.31735 
HICP 0.016669  0.074925 0.222480 Rez -1.61E-11 ** 7.12E-12 -2.261899 
PIB -0.401979 *** 0.099716 4.031257 HICP -0.134037 *** 0.064672 -2.072576 
Gov -0.339891 ** 0.165007 -2.059859 GDP -0.181158 *** 0.055989 -3.235632 
UR 0.517715 *** 0.065855 7.861490 Gov 0.247548 *** 0.063723 3.884743 
IRS 0.234708  0.274242 0.855844 WL 0.426027 *** 0.055027 7.742114 
LIR -0.584114 *** 0.181094 -3.225481     
R-squared 0.559163    R-squared 0.301165    
Adjusted R-squared 0.507503    Adjusted R-squared 0.260737    
F-statistic 10.40857    F-statistic 7.449333    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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have a negative impact on the non-performing loans in the developed world and a positive one in the emerging 
economies of Latin America. Fiori, Foglia and Iannotti, 2009 noticed a direct correlation between the spread of 
the interest rate and the rate of non-performing loans in the Italian economy. 
In the case of the relation between the bank capital and the macroeconomic variables in equation (2) we can 
observe that all the five suggested variables are significant. Of these, the total reserves (except gold), the 
inflation rate and GDP have a negative impact on the quality of the capital while the governmental result and 
the labor productivity have a positive impact on the bank capital to assets ratio. The determination coefficient 
shows that 30 % of the variation of the capital rate contingent on assets can be explained by the estimated 
regression model. The three variables with a negative impact lead to the decrease of the banks' capital and 
implicitly to a decrease of the resistance capacity of the banking system. A 1% increase of the budgetary output 
leads to an increase of 0,24% of the capital rate, while a 1% increase of labor productivity leads to an increase 
of the capital rate of 0,42%. The two variables with a positive direct impact are conductive of improvement of 
the capitalization of the banks in the banking systems considered in our analysis.  
4. Conclusions 
A framework for macro prudential supervision is still 'in the making' but important steps were taken towards 
a concrete uniform framework for this activity, essential in insuring financial stability. The empirical analysis of 
the banking system in the EU reveals strong correlations between the economic trends and the indicators of 
banks' financial soundness. This interdependency points to the need for a consolidated cooperation between the 
authorities responsible for financial surveillance and the governmental authorities in charge of economic and 
fiscal policies towards efficient, coordinated measures that can lead to reduced systemic risks and financial 
stability. The methods used to signal financial crises vary and the field literature accounts for this variety. The 
empirical research outlined in this paper allowed for the study of several trends and correlations, but this model 
can be expanded to become an early-warning system for banking crises; also different macro stress tests can be 
conducted to check the capacity of the banking systems to withstand macroeconomic shocks.   
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